We build a quality ladders product cycle model with Northern innovation, Northern imitation, and Southern imitation. Our model generalizes Grossman and Helpman (1991a) to allow Northern imitation. Similar to Segerstrom (1991), successful Northern imitators collude with innovators. Changes in resources and R&D subsidies generate substitution in Northern R&D between innovation and imitation and substitution in imitation between the North and the South. Due to the shifting composition of Northern R&D, an increase in the di¢culty of innovation can generate seemingly decreasing returns to scale in Northern R&D: innovation remaining constant despite an expansion in the resources employed in Northern R&D.
Introduction
The rapid advancement in high-technology products contributes substantially to economic growth. Innovations generally occur in developed countries, while imitations occur in all but the poorest of countries. A literature on product cycles has emerged to explain the implications of imitation for the speed of innovations. This paper makes several contributions to the product cycle literature.
First, compared to one-country models of imitation and innovation such as Segerstrom (1991) , we add imitation in a second country, the South. Similar to Segerstrom, et al. (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991) , Southern imitation can be supported by Southern imitators undercutting the prices of Northern …rms due to their lower costs. Also, compared to two-country models of Northern innovation and Southern imitation such as Grossman and Helpman (1991) , we add Northern imitation, with imitation easier than innovation. Similar to Segerstrom (1991) , Northern imitation can be supported by Northern imitators colluding with the innovators whose products they targeted. This paper addresses how changes in parameters -such as resource supplies or R&D subsidies -alter the mix of imitation between the North and the South and the mix of Northern R&D between innovation and imitation.
Second, we address the issue of apparent decreasing returns to scale in R&D -speci…cally whether parameter changes could generate the appearance of decreasing returns to scale in R&D even though R&D is actually constant returns to scale at any one point in time. Data suggests more resources are being devoted to R&D without an appreciable increase in R&D output; see Eaton and Kortum (1996) , Kortum (1993) , and Jones (1995) . Hence, Cheng and Tao (1999) , Davidson and Segerstrom (1998) , Kortum (1997) , Segerstrom (1998) , and Young (1998) have reformulated endogenous growth models to involve decreasing returns to scale in R&D. This paper instead maintains an assumption of constant returns to scale in R&D but explores how changes in parameters translate into changes in the resources devoted to R&D and the rate of innovation. The main …nding is that an increased di¢culty of innovation over time (rather than with scale) could be consistent with the observed data due to substitution within R&D between imitation and innovation.
Model with Northern and Southern Imitation
Consumers live in one of two countries, North and South, and choose from a continuum of products available in discrete quality levels. Consumer preferences are as speci…ed in Grossman and Helpman (1991) , so the consumer's problem shares the same solution.
Consumers
Consumers choose from a continuum of products j 2 [0; 1]. Quality level m of product j provides quality q m (j)´¸m. By the de…nition of quality improvement, new generations are better than the old: q m (j) > q m¡1 (j) ! m >¸m ¡1 !¸> 1. All products start at time t = 0 at quality level m = 0, so the base quality is q 0 (j) =¸0 = 1.
A consumer from country i 2 fN; Sg has additively separable intertemporal preferences given by lifetime utility
where ½ is the common subjective discount factor. Instantaneous utility is
where x im (j; t) is consumption by consumers from country i of quality level m of product j at time t. Consumers maximize lifetime utility subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. Since preferences are homothetic, aggregate demand is found by maximizing lifetime utility subject to the aggregate intertemporal budget constraint
where R(t) = R t 0 r(s)ds is the cumulative interest rate up to time t and A i (0) is the aggregate value of initial asset holdings by consumers from country i. Individuals hold assets in the form of ownership in …rms, but with a diversi…ed portfolio, any capital losses appear as capital gains elsewhere so only initial asset holdings remain. Aggregate labor income of all consumers from country i is Y i (t) = L i w i (t), where w i (t) is the wage in country i at time t and L i is the labor supply there, so L i w i (t) is total labor income in country i at time t. Aggregate expenditure of all consumers in country i is
where p m (j; t) is the price of quality level m of product j at time t, and E i (t) is aggregate expenditure of consumers in country i, where overall aggregate expenditure is E(t) = E N (t) + E S (t). Due to assumed free trade, price levels do not vary across countries. A consumer's maximization problem can be broken into three stages: the allocation of lifetime wealth across time, the allocation of expenditure at each instant across products, and the allocation of expenditure at each instant for each product across available quality levels. In the …nal stage, consumers allocate expenditure for each product at each instant to the quality level f m(j; t) o¤ering the lowest quality-adjusted price, p m (j; t)=¸m. Consumers are indi¤erent between quality level m and quality level m ¡ 1 if the relative price equals the quality di¤erence p m (j; t)=p m¡1 (j; t) =¸. Settle indi¤erence in favor of the higher quality level so the quality level selected is unique. Only the highest quality level available will sell in equilibrium.
In the second stage, consumers then evenly spread expenditure across the unit measure of all products, E i (j; t) = E i (t), as the elasticity of substitution between any two products is constant at unity. Consumers demand x i e m (j; t) = E i (t)=p e m (j; t) units of quality level f m(j; t) of product j and no units of other quality levels of that product. In the …rst stage, consumers evenly spread lifetime expenditure across time, E i (t) = E i , as the utility function for each consumer is time separable and the aggregate price level will be shown to not vary across time log p e m (j; t) = log p e m (j). Since aggregate expenditure is constant across time, the interest rate at each point in time re ‡ects the discount rate r (t) = ½, so R(t) = ½t in the intertemporal budget constraint.
Production
All innovation occurs in the North, while imitation occurs in both the North and the South. We normalize prices by the Southern wage w S = 1. The Northern wage relative to the Southern wage thus equals the Northern wage w´w N =w S = w N . Normalizing the labor supplies in each country so that one unit of labor is needed to produce one unit of output (of any quality) in either country, Northern …rms have production cost w, while Southern …rms have production cost 1.
In the production stage, each …rm chooses its price given the prices (and R&D intensities) of other …rms. A Northern …rm with a one quality level lead over its closest rival charges a price re ‡ecting the willingness to pay for quality improvements p N =¸and thus earns instantaneous pro…ts
where E is aggregate expenditure. Northern innovators are assumed to face Southern …rms as their rivals one quality level below -regardless of whether they innovated over a Northern or a Southern …rm due to an assumption of free access to discarded technology or equivalently costless licensing of obsolete technology. The technology for producing any quality level of a good that is below the highest available (the state-of-the-art) has no value as it can generate no pro…ts in equilibrium. Thus, as in Glass (1997) , any …rm that previously innovated or imitated a now obsolete technology would have no reason to protect its product design. If another Northern …rm then imitates that quality level, the two Northern …rms have the same costs of production and collude by maintaining the limit price p M =¸and splitting the market evenly, each earning instantaneous pro…ts.
The pro…ts for each …rm after Northern imitation are exactly half of the profits for an innovator prior to imitation, so total industry pro…ts remain unchanged. This property follows from the ability of the innovator and Northern imitator to perfectly collude using a tit-for-tat strategy (see Subsection 2.4 for details). The model can be modi…ed to allow the pro…ts after imitation to be any fraction less than one-half of monopoly pro…ts, if post-imitation collusion is imperfect. If a Southern …rm imitates that quality level (either before or after a Northern …rm has imitated it), the Southern …rm can capture the whole market due to its lower costs by charging a price equal to a Northern …rm's cost p S = w and earning instantaneous pro…ts.
Southern …rms are assumed to capture the whole market by undercutting the price of Northern …rms, rather than colluding to split the market. The instantaneous pro…ts are integrated over time to determine the value of an innovation or imitation. The probability that a stream of pro…ts will be terminated depends on the R&D targeting the market. We assume all Northern …rms are equally able to conduct innovation (regardless of whether they made the previous innovation), so innovation targets all markets, including products that have not yet been imitated. New products are exposed to both Northern imitation and Southern imitation. Following Northern imitation, the Northern innovator and imitator collude to share the market, but are still exposed to Southern imitation due to their higher costs than a Southern …rm.
A successful innovator earns pro…ts (5) until subsequent innovation or imitation occurs. If innovation or Southern imitation occurs, the pro…t stream ends and the …rm looses all value.
However, if Northern imitation occurs, the pro…t stream is merely reduced, and the original innovator as well as the new imitator each have the value
until innovation or Southern imitation occurs. A second Northern imitation will not occur in equilibrium, provided second imitations are as costly as …rst imitations (or not much less costly), because a second Northern imitator would earn a one-third share of pro…ts, which would be dominated by a onehalf share from achieving a …rst imitation. Finally, a Southern imitator's value is eroded only by imitation, since neither Northern nor further Southern imitation would be pro…table.
Again, assuming second Southern imitations would be as costly as …rst Southern imitations, a second Southern imitator, even if colluded with the …rst Southern imitator, would earn only half the pro…t stream, and thus be dominated by making a …rst imitation instead.
Research and Development
In the R&D stage, each …rm chooses its intensity of R&D to maximize its expected value, given the R&D intensities of other …rms. R&D races occur simultaneously for all products. Following Grossman and Helpman (1991) , a …rm undertaking R&D intensity ¶ k for a time interval dt requires a k ¶ k dt units of labor and leads to success with probability ¶ k dt, k = N; M; S. For simplicity, Northern …rms have the same innovation costs regardless of whether they innovated the previous generation and the quality increment¸is …xed. Absence of Southern innovation can be supported by a su¢ciently large resource requirement in Southern innovation.
Focusing on a steady-state equilibrium with positive intensities of innovation ¶ N , Northern imitation ¶ M , and Southern imitation ¶ S , the expected value generated by each R&D success must match the cost of achieving the R&D success. Making the usual assumptions, the R&D equilibrium conditions are v N = wa N for innovation, v M = wa M for Northern imitation and v S = a S for Southern imitation.
De…ning the inverse of the quality improvement ±´1=¸, these R&D valuation conditions are combined with the expressions for …rm value and pro…ts to generate
13)
These expressions complete the description of …rm behavior.
Implicit Collusion
Consider markets where a Northern …rm has imitated. A collusive equilibrium can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium by the …rms playing trigger strategies in the repeated game: both …rms pick the price p M =u nless either …rm defects, in which case the other …rm would pick p D = w during the permanent punishment phase. Given this strategy, neither …rm ever (for …nite discount rate and su¢ciently short lag in retaliation) deviates from p M =¸, as higher instantaneous pro…ts would require sacri…ce of all future pro…ts following retaliation.
Following Segerstrom (1991) , suppose retaliation can occur only after some lag 0 <`< 1. For either …rm to cooperate, its value v M from cooperation must exceed the value v D stemming from a deviation. Let ¼ D = ¼ N represent instantaneous pro…ts a …rm earns when deviating before the other retaliates (the deviator charges an " below¸, but pro…ts are arbitrarily close to ¼ N due to " being arbitrarily close to zero). A …rm that defects earns instantaneous defecting pro…ts until either the other …rm retaliates or rival innovation or imitation occurs and terminates the pro…t stream.
At each instant, the defecting …rm earns instantaneous pro…ts
has not yet occurred and the lag until retaliation has not yet expired. Once the lag has passed, neither …rm earns any further pro…ts.
Instantaneous pro…ts for a defecting …rm are maximized by charging a price in…nitesimally below p M =¸and thus capturing the whole market. For cooperation to be supported, the lag must be su¢ciently short
In the limit as the lag becomes in…nitesimally small`! 0, the …rms always cooperate. Provided the relative wage is su¢ciently large [w > e w = 2= (1 + 1=¸)], Southern …rms successful in imitation will prefer not to collude with Northern …rms. The condition on the relative wage is less binding as the quality increment¸shrinks [lim¸! 1 e w = 1 and lim¸! 1 e w = 2], as Southern …rms are weighing part of a bigger pie (based on¸) against all of a smaller price (based on w).
Resource Constraints
R&D and production in each country are constrained by the …xed supply of a scarce resources. Let each n k ; k = N; M; S represent the fraction of all markets where innovation, Northern imitation, or Southern imitation was the most recent R&D success (these market measures sum to one). The …xed supply of Northern resources L N is allocated to production (1 ¡ n S ) E± in both types of Northern markets and to R&D that is composed of both innovation targeting all markets a N ¶ N and Northern imitation targeting Northern innovator markets a M ¶ M n N .
Similarly, the …xed supply of Southern resources L S is allocated to production n S E=w in Southern imitator markets and to imitation targeting all markets that have not yet been imitated by a Southern …rm a S ¶ S (1 ¡ n S ).
These resource constraint combine with the R&D valuation conditions to form the …ve key equations of the model.
Constant Market Measures
In a steady-state equilibrium, the market measures are linked to the R&D intensities through conditions necessary for the market measures to remain constant. Each market measure must have as many products ‡owing into as ‡owing out of that market structure at each point in time. For Northern innovator markets, the ‡ows in are innovation targeting all other markets (innovation does target Northern innovator markets but does not generate any in ‡ows into the market structure), while the ‡ows out are the Northern and Southern imitation targeting these markets.
Similarly, for Northern imitator markets, the ‡ows in are Northern imitation (which targets Northern innovator markets), while the ‡ows out are innovation and Southern imitation targeting these markets.
Finally, the three market measures must sum to one since they completely describe the possible market structures.
These equations can be solved to …nd expressions for each market measure in terms of the R&D intensities.
Transform System
At this point, we transform the system into the variables of primary interest: the aggregate rate of innovation, Northern imitation relative to innovation, and Southern imitation relative to innovation. The aggregate rate of innovation is the same as the intensity of innovation (since innovation targets all markets): ¶´ ¶ N . The rate of Northern imitation is the intensity of Northern imitation times the measure of Northern innovator markets targeted: Ã = ¶ M n N . Similarly, the rate of Southern imitation is the intensity of Southern imitation times the measure of Northern innovator and imitator markets targeted: ¹´ ¶ S (1 ¡ n S ). Northern imitation relative to innovation is then´´Ã= ¶, and Southern imitation relative to innovation is º´¹= ¶.
Northern imitation relative to innovation´and Southern imitation relative to innovation º describe the fraction of product cycles that occur through Northern imitation and Southern imitation, respectively. These measures allow us to describe the composition of Northern R&D between innovation and imitation, and the composition of imitation between the North and the South. These measures also allow us to fully characterize the composition of the product cycle between innovation, Northern imitation, and Southern imitation. For example, if both´and º rise (due to some parameter change), then fewer product cycles occur through innovation of products that have not yet been imitated. On the other hand, if º rises while´falls (or stays constant), then more product cycles occur though Southern imitation (relative to Northern imitation): the mix of imitation has shifted toward the South.
Substitution in R&D
Having speci…ed the system that determines the equilibrium for a world where innovation occurs in the North and imitation occurs in the North and the South, we can examine how the equilibrium is a¤ected by shifts in the resource supplies, resource requirements in R&D, or R&D subsidies. Since we have transformed the model to determine Northern imitation relative to innovation, the model demonstrates whether each force generates any shift in the composition of Northern R&D between innovation and imitation.
Resource Supplies
Although innovation occurs only in the North, the rate of innovation is essentially driven by the world supply of resources. Increases in Southern resources permit an expansion of Southern imitation, both absolutely and relative to the rate of innovation. With more Southern imitation, more products are produced in the South, which frees up Northern resources for more innovation. Since Northern imitation does not locate production any di¤erently than Northern innovation, it remains in a …xed proportion relative to the rate of innovation as resources are varied -the composition of Northern R&D remains unchanged. However, whereas increases in Southern resources shift the composition of imitation toward the South, increases in Northern resources shift the composition of imitation toward the North.
Proposition 1 An increase in Northern or Southern resources increases the rate of innovation, the rate of Northern imitation, and the rate of Southern imitation. An increase in Southern resources expands Southern imitation relative to innovation, while an increase in Northern resource contracts it. Neither resource supply a¤ects Northern imitation relative to innovation.
R&D Subsidies
Grossman and Helpman (1991) derive di¤ering results depending on whether followers (…rms who did not make the previous innovation) are e¢cient (have innovation costs low enough that engage in innovation) or not; see also Segerstrom et al. (1990) . They …nd that a subsidy to innovation increases the rate of innovation, and decreases the rate of Southern imitation for the case of e¢cient followers, but increases the rate of Southern imitation for the case of ine¢cient followers. Likewise, they …nd that a subsidy to Southern imitation increases the rate of Southern imitation and decreases the rate of innovation for the case of e¢cient followers, but increases the rate of innovation for the case of ine¢cient followers.
R&D subsidies can be analyzed by adding terms (1 ¡ ¾ i ) to the cost side of the R&D valuation conditions. An increase in the subsidy to Southern imitation ¾ S unambiguously increases the rate of innovation, as well as the rates of Southern and Northern imitation. A subsidy to Southern imitation makes Southern imitation less costly, and thus the reward to Southern imitation must fall. From (10), the reward to Southern imitation is reduced by an increase in innovation (the intensity of innovation and the rate of innovation are the same here as innovation targets all markets). The composition of imitation shifts away from the South, while the composition of Northern R&D is una¤ected.
Proposition 2 An increase in the Southern imitation subsidy increases the rate of innovation, the rate of Northern imitation, and the rate of Southern imitation, decreases Southern imitation relative to innovation, and does not a¤ect the Northern imitation relative to innovation.
Governments generally experience di¢culty distinguishing innovative R&D from imitative R&D. Hence, like Davidson and Segerstrom (1998) , we analyze a general R&D subsidy ¾ to all Northern R&D (@¾ N = @¾ M = @¾). The composition of imitation shifts toward the South, while the composition of Northern R&D is una¤ected. Thus, a general Northern R&D subsidy has e¤ects like those of an innovation subsidy in ine¢cient followers equilibrium of Grossman and Helpman (1991) .
Proposition 3 An increase in the general Northern R&D subsidy increases the rate of innovation, the rate of Northern imitation, the rate of Southern imitation, and Southern imitation relative to innovation, but does not a¤ect Northern imitation relative to innovation.
Resource Requirements in Northern R&D
Surprisingly, the rate of innovation is una¤ected by the resource requirement in innovation, as is Southern imitation relative to innovation. While intuition might suggest the resource requirement in innovation should be a key determinant of the rate of innovation, such intuition ignores the substitution possibilities in Northern R&D. The impact on the composition of R&D seems perverse: when innovation becomes more di¢cult, more innovation relative to Northern imitation results. The impact on the composition of imitation is to divert more imitation to the South due to Northern imitation being squeezed out by the added resource demand in the North for innovation due to innovation's higher cost.
Proposition 4 An increase in the resource requirement in innovation decreases the rate of Northern imitation and Northern imitation relative to innovation, but does not a¤ect the rate of innovation, the rate of Southern imitation, or Southern imitation relative to innovation.
Increases in the resource requirement in Northern imitation also reduce the rate of innovation. Also intuitively, Southern imitation relative to innovation expands when Northern imitation becomes more di¢cult. The impact on the composition of R&D seems perverse: when Northern imitation becomes more di¢cult, more Northern imitation relative to innovation results. However, this adjustment occurs in the direction of easier R&D to free up the additional Northern resources needed for Northern imitation. Indeed, the composition of imitation shifts toward the North as Northern imitation expands while Southern imitation contracts (to raise the reward to Northern imitation).
Proposition 5 An increase in the resource requirement in Northern imitation decreases the rate of innovation and the rate of Southern imitation, and increases the rate of Northern imitation, Southern imitation relative to innovation, and Northern imitation relative to innovation.
Suppose both Northern imitation and Northern innovation become more di¢cult (@a N = a N @· and @a M = a M @·). Increases in the overall di¢culty of Northern R&D reduce the rate of innovation. Also intuitively, Southern imitation relative to innovation expands. Northern imitation relative to innovation (the composition of R&D) is una¤ected, so the composition of imitation shifts towards more Southern imitation relative to Northern imitation.
Proposition 6 An increase in the resource requirements in Northern R&D decreases the rate of innovation, the rate of Northern imitation, the rate of Southern imitation, increases Southern imitation relative to innovation, but does not a¤ect Northern imitation relative to innovation. 
Returns to Scale in R&D
The resources employed in Northern R&D can be expressed as
where the resource requirement in Northern imitation relative to innovation is µ´a M =a N . The ratio of Northern R&D resources per innovation are therefore R= ¶ = ·a N (1 + µ´), which suggests this ratio could rise due to increases in: the resource requirement in innovation a N , the resource requirement in Northern imitation relative to innovation µ, the overall di¢culty of Northern R&D, or Northern imitation relative to innovation´. In fact, the mix of imitation in Northern R&D is an endogenous variable, so other parameters could a¤ect the ratio R= ¶ through´(and the e¤ect of a N and µ on R= ¶ must include any indirect e¤ect through´).
Results for the e¤ects of changes in the resource requirement in Southern imitation, Northern imitation subsidy, and Northern innovation subsidy are also available -see Appendix A.8. Due to the lack of any shift in the composition of Northern R&D, changes in resources supplies, the resource requirement in Southern imitation, the subsidy to Southern imitation, or the general Northern R&D subsidy exhibit constant returns to scale -a true re ‡ection of the R&D technology. Changes in the resource requirement in Northern imitation, the overall di¢culty of Northern R&D, the subsidy to Northern imitation or the subsidy to innovation generate seemingly increasing returns to scale due to decreasing the resources employed in Northern R&D.
Thus, the only force consistent with steadily increasing resource employment in R&D but no corresponding increase in the rate of innovation is if innovations are becoming harder over time: increases in a N . Such an explanation is consistent in spirit with true decreasing returns to scale in R&D. R&D could have constant returns to scale at each point in time and still appear to exhibit decreasing returns to scale over time as the resource requirement in innovation increases for reasons other than the scale of R&D. The decreasing returns are not necessarily due to scale in this case, but the variables move in a way that appears equivalent to decreasing returns to scale.
Conclusion
This paper studies the e¤ect on the total resources devoted to R&D per innovation, the composition of Northern R&D between innovation and imitation, and the composition of imitation between the North and the South of changes in resource supplies, R&D e¢ciency, and R&D subsidies. The model determines whether results for one-country models of innovation and imitation such as Segerstrom (1991) are sensitive to adding a second imitating country or two-country models where the North exclusively innovates such as Grossman and Helpman (1991) are sensitive to adding Northern imitation. Finally, the model determines whether such forces as changes in resource supplies or the di¢culty of R&D can generate seemingly decreasing returns to scale in Northern R&D, innovation growing far less than resources employed in R&D, as in Jones (1995) . The only change consistent with more resources used for a given R&D output is decreases in the e¢ciency of Northern innovation. Hence, instead of true decreasing returns to scale, the e¤ort needed to generate an innovation could be rising over time but still display constant returns to scale at any one point in time.
A Appendix
Assign ¶ N = ¶, ¶ M =´ ¶=n N , and ¶ S = º ¶= (1 ¡ n S ). The expressions for the market measures become n N = (1 ¡´) (1 ¡ º), n M =´(1 ¡ º), and n S = º. Solving the Northern imitation valuation condition (12) for aggregate expenditure
Assign this expression and then solve the Southern imitation valuation condition (11) for the relative wage
Assign this expression and then the Northern resource constraint (16), Southern resource constraint (17) and innovation valuation condition (13) become
Totally di¤erentiate this reduced system in the endogenous variables f ¶;´; ¹g with respect to the parameters fL N ; L S ; a N ; a M ; a S g; ¾ N , ¾ M , ¾ S , and ¾ are suppressed for brevity. where
and
To simplify expressions for the derivatives, apply the de…nitions of each resource requirement in imitation relative to innovation a M´µ a N and a S´°aN . The determinant is positivē´j
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6 
A.8 MAPLE Files and Additional Results
MAPLE programs that derive and check all results for accuracy are available upon request or from the web at:
http://economics.sbs.ohio-state.edu/pdf/glass/srdmap.pdf A supplement that derives the e¤ects of changes in the resource requirement in Southern imitation, Northern imitation subsidy, and Northern innovation subsidy are available upon request or from the web at:
http://economics.sbs.ohio-state.edu/pdf/glass/srdsup.pdf
